60 Minutes recently ran a story about California High Speed Rail (CAHSR). I haven’t been particularly impressed by the project or the news story. Multiple decades spent building a train to nowhere? A partisan Bari Weiss hitpiece on Gavin Newsom?
I’ve lived in California for the past 25 years, minus a three-year stint in New Zealand. I voted on the 2008 Prop 1A ballot measure that kicked off the CAHSR project. I think I voted in favor, although I’m not totally sure. I loved the experience of taking high speed trains in Europe and Japan. I regularly traveled (and travel) between Los Angeles and San Francisco. But I also never believed the ballot measure was … realistic. I did also get a PhD in Transportation Engineering from the University of California, focusing on uncertainty and infrastructure management. The pitfalls of megaprojects was one of the hottest topics in the field at the time. My advisor later led a team that wrote a critical review of the CAHSR project’s ridership projections.
There are definitely people in my network who know more about this project than I do. There are even one or two who worked on CAHSR. Feel free to let me know what I’m missing or getting wrong. There are also definitely people in my network who know less about this project. There are points that I feel are important but that I rarely see mentioned. So I’ll try to focus on those details but add in some conjecture for fun.
Progress Check
It’s been nearly 20 years since Prop 1A passed. You would think we would have made a lot of progress on CAHSR. The story is, of course, that we have not. We are, sadly, far from having the system envisioned by Prop 1A. But even so, I think people are overestimating just how far we have not come.
People often visualize the project via a map of California. The map makes it look we’ve covered a lot of the distance between San Francisco and Los Angeles. Many people I speak with think we are roughly halfway through the system build out.
The CAHSR Authority likes to talk about mileage. For example, they note that “[c]onstruction is active across 119 miles.” A lot of the discussion focuses on the Initial Operating Segment (IOS), a 171 mile section between Merced and Bakersfield. Don’t trust the official estimates on a project like this, but that section will likely be operational in the next decade. All of Phase 1, from San Francisco to Anaheim, is less than 500 miles. So maybe we are 20 to 40 percent of the way there?
According to the CAHSR Authority’s 2026 Business Plan, that same Phase 1 is forecast to cost over $126 Billion. That same plan notes that we have spent less than $15 Billion. Roughly 12%. I think that might be the most relevant math. We are 12% of the way there.
The Palmdale to Burbank section, by itself, is forecast to cost more than what we’ve spent to date. That is in dollars adjusted for inflation. That is after the Authority revised the cost of the Palmdale to Burbank section down by about a third since 2024. I think by going with single-track instead of double-track rail. We haven’t spent enough to date to build high speed rail between Palmdale and Burbank. This is the part I think people don’t realize.
The Authority’s 2026 estimate for the cost of Phase 1 is likely an underestimate. That’s the nature of megaprojects. It also doesn’t cover the potential section from the 4th and King Caltrain station to the Salesforce Transit Center in downtown San Francisco. The Authority has been counting on using existing Caltrain infrastructure between San Francisco and Gilroy for years now (the “blended approach”) to save money. These are two of my pet peeves, just because I’d really like to see the high speed rail work better with the existing transit infrastructure in the Bay Area. But I’m aware of the cost implications. Also, yea, it’ll be multiple decades before either of these two sections are relevant.
California recently enacted legislation “providing $1bn per year [in funding for CAHSR] until 2045.” That will increase the pace of progress but recall the Authority’s $126 Billion project cost estimate.
CAHSR proponents probably like to overstate progress made to date to paint the project as less of a disaster than it’s been. And to make it seem like we could finish the project relatively soon. I don’t think that’s remotely possible. Stop asking what it would take to finish the project in 5 or 10 years.
CAHSR detractors probably like to overstate what’s been done to make it seem like the government has wasted more money or built more infrastructure than it has. For what it’s worth, recent tax cuts and tax cut extensions will cost close to 300 times as much as the $15 Billion spent so far on CAHSR. We can’t build big things in this country any more. Or tax the rich.
The State We Are In
The 60 Minutes story, like most CAHSR press, focuses on the fact that we are currently only building the section between Merced and Bakersfield. Why there? So dumb! No, but really, why there?
CAHSR was always going to cost a fortune and going to require lots of federal funding. The first big award that the project received was $2.5 Billion via the federal government’s American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. This Act was a stimulus package in response to the 2008–9 Recession. The money had to be spent quickly to spur economic recovery. The only place that money could be spent quickly at the time was in the Central Valley. As an aside, $2.5 Billion sounds like a lot but represents about 0.3% of the cost of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. A lot more was spent on, you guessed it, tax cuts. The Wall Street Bailout of roughly the same time frame cost $700 Billion.
Additional federal funding followed, with similar restrictions. For example, on October 28, 2010 the federal government gave the project $715 million but, according to the CAHSR Authority “earmark[ed] the money for either the Merced-to-Fresno or Fresno-to-Bakersfield sections” of the project. It’s apparent in the Authority’s press release that they would have preferred to spend the money in other geographic areas.
Once the project got started in earnest, the best prospects for attracting additional govenment funding often involved building off the work already underway in the Central Valley. California legislators also passed their own earmarks and laws requiring that money be spent in the Central Valley. I’m guessing state politics are to blame. We are only now debating a law that would undo a $500 million cap on spending outside of the Central Valley.
Of course it was dumb to start with, and focus so much, on the section between Merced and Bakersfield. If we stop the project after this section is completed, ridership will be low. Fares will never come close to covering maintenance fees alone. I suppose it’s better than if we had focused on Palmdale to Burbank, but that’s not saying much. If we had spent the $15 Billion on improving rail in more urban areas, say between San Francisco and San Jose or Los Angeles and Anaheim, we could have produced something of use to far more people. The real question is why the focus has been on Merced to Bakersfield. I think it’s clear the reasons include national and state politics and the ways in which transportation projects are selected and funded in this country. It’s difficult to say more than that, but even that is deeper than most of the reporting and discussion I’ve seen online.
CAHSR proponents sometimes defend the work in the Central Valley by pointing out that more people than you’d think live in the Central Valley and that the area needs economic stimulation. At least to me, it comes across as partisan and naive. I heard one backer say that once Merced to Bakersfield is done, either the Cost Benefit Analysis of the remaining work or the sunk cost fallacy will convince California to finish the route from Los Angeles to Anaheim. I’m not so sure. Recall the 12% number. Some will talk about how CAHSR is designed to be the spine of a statewide system, working for all Californians, and not just to connect San Francisco and Los Angeles. That’s why we built on the East and not the West side of the Central Valley. Sure, but also, kind of beside the point? I don’t know. I find Urban Planning Youtube a little much, if I’m honest.
CAHSR detractors will often blame Gavin Newsom for the decision to focus on Merced to Bakersfield. In my opinion, he is not the real villain here.
The Newsom Angle
The 60 Minutes story name checks Gavin Newsom a few times. Right wing media outlets are using the story to bash Newsom. See for example the New York Post headline about “Gavin Newsom’s high-speed rail humiliation.” I’m guessing this is the start of what will become a drumbeat of articles and soundbites attempting to tie Newsom to the failure of CAHSR. The relevant audience has already been primed to think of California, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and government projects as basket cases. Things are actually pretty great here, but I guess I don’t mind if half the country doesn’t think so.
Personally, I think Newsom has been a realist when it comes to the project. In 2019, he got in trouble with many CAHSR supporters for saying “there simply isn’t a path to get from Sacramento to San Diego, let alone from San Francisco to L.A. I wish there were.” This was in the the speech where he decided to focus on the Merced to Bakersfield section. It’s clear from the context that we was making the best out of what he felt was a bad situation.
One news story from Fresno’s Fox affiliate shows Newsom in 2014 talking about what a disaster CAHSR was at the time. This hits closer to the mark for me. I can believe he was always deeply skeptical of the project. I don’t believe he has ever stuck his neck out for the project the way you could claim that he has for, say, same-sex marriage. You could say that Newsom’s lack of interest is the problem, that he could have either killed the project and saved the federal and state governments money or pushed harder to complete the project. But personally, I don’t believe he ever had the political capital to do either. The project has not gone well and, from what I can see, that doesn’t have much to do with Newsom. Maybe I’m being too generous.
The Brightline Angle
A sizable portion of the 60 Minutes story is about Brightline West, an effort led by a private company to build high speed rail between Las Vegas and Rancho Cucamonga outside of Los Angeles. CAHSR detractors will often compare the CAHSR project unfavorably to Brightline West. Construction began on Brightline West in 2024 and service is expected to begin in 2029. The total estimated cost of the project is $21 billion. I’m not sure you should believe either number but at least that 2029 estimate is undoubtedly impressive.
Both CAHSR critics and the 60 Minutes story highlight the fact that Brightline West is planning to build within the existing I-15 right of way to save time and money. Neither highlight the facts that Rancho Cucamonga is a sleepy suburb far from downtown Los Angeles or that the project is now forecast to cost more than we have spent on CAHSR to date. To its credit, the 60 Minutes story does highlight the fact that Brightline West is using federal government funding and is facing severe financial challenges. Brightline has never turned a profit and its bond rating has been lowered to “junk” status. Let’s be honest, high speed rail in America is not a great business to be in.
One thing I don’t see much discussion about is the costs or challenges associated with trying to build high speed rail within the existing I-15 right of way. CAHSR is constructing infrastructure designed to allow it to operate at 220 miles per hour, which is incredibly fast even by European and Asian standards. The original plan was to build a double-track railway. Although the CAHSR Authority is now recommending a lot of single-track, they are leaving the door open to double-tracking later. You know for when we have more than $126 Billion to spend. In any event, I would bet that it’s not possible to build much double-track, 220 miles per hour railway within the I-15 right of way. But I haven’t seen too much discussion of this. There are so many detail-oriented railfans out there. I’m surprised none have looked at the I-15 corridor and Brightline West plans in detail and documented what is and is not realistic. Maybe they have and I just haven’t seen it yet.
My sense is that Brightline West is getting a relatively easy ride in the media. CAHSR detractors probably like to think the private sector is succeeding where the public failed. Many CAHSR supporters probably just like rail and like the idea of a complimentary service. I don’t recall 60 Minutes mentioning it, but Brightline West is also building a connection to the future CAHSR station in Palmdale. Which might be wise. I wouldn’t bet against CAHSR stalling there, given how expensive it will be to get it to Burbank. Should we all be buying real estate around the Palmdale station? We have plenty of time to think it over.